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Abstract 
Exploitation techniques targeting intermediate (transit) network 
nodes in public and private networks have been theoretically 
known and empirically proven to work for quite some time. 
However, very little effort has been made to look into the 
network-specific risks of compromising the Internet 
infrastructure to this date. In this publication, we describe 
several methods of hijacking live network traffic following a 
successful attack on a router or switch. We demonstrate that 
modern network platforms are capable of targeted traffic 
replication and redirection for online and offline analysis and 
modification, which can be a threat far greater than loss of 
service or other risks frequently associated with such exploits. 
Keywords—routers; switches; security; traffic redirect; network 
attack 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
After early days of the Internet predecessor ARPANET, 
transit network nodes were traditionally based on the heavily 
modified software packages, very similar to DEC RT-11 or 
various flavors of UNIX [1][2][3]. In today’s network OS 
lineup, donor code from Linux, FreeBSD, VxWorks, and QNX 
still prevails [4] and is widely used for various internal and 
housekeeping errands such as TCP header compression, SNMP 
and telnet management, HTTP administrative tools, SSH 
access, and so on. As a result, the development of rootkits 
designed to gain unauthorized remote access for network nodes 
is not significantly different from that of general purpose 
computers and has been shown to be effective against a wide 
range of routers and switches—including recent examples of 
such exploits of Huawei [5] and Cisco [6] products.  
However, traditionally public and private IP nodes have not 
been popular targets for attackers. The reason is that routers 
and switches present little value as “jump hosts” unless they 
connect together zones of different security levels. Network 
nodes are also of marginal interest as botnet members 
(relatively weak processing power and slow management 
interfaces) or host platforms for local data collection (no stored 
information). The main security concern about routers and 
switches has been the possibility of hackers wreaking havoc in 
large networks by deliberately crashing systems or introducing 
errors into the running protocols. For example, the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database [7] lists no less 
than 40 records for vulnerabilities allowing remote attackers to 
crash Cisco IOS and IOS XR devices; another 159 documents 
describe denial-of-service (DoS) techniques capable of 
exhausting critical resources. At the same time, there are only 
five known “administrative access class” exploits listed for 
IOS, mostly related to hardcoded or default SNMP and HTTP 
access procedures.1 By comparison, NIST CVE queries for a 
general purpose OS (Windows NT) reveal 168 DoS exploits. 
Simultaneously, there are no less than 55 records of critical 
vulnerabilities on Windows NT potentially leading to 
unauthorized remote access. While this might be indicative of a 
wider set of attack opportunities inside a general purpose OS, 
there is also a strong chance that hackers are simply less 
interested in gaining access to the network infrastructure 
devices. This assumption is further supported by ready-made 
shellcode repositories. The Metasploit auxiliary module and 
exploit database, for example, contains only one Cisco IOS 
rootkit module compared to hundreds of modules developed 
for general-purpose host operating systems [8]. 
While the attacks on the routing and switching 
infrastructure may be harder to organize than consumer-grade 
exploitation of computers, they may offer an easier and quicker 
way to mount Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) assaults. 
Relative to “traditional” APT techniques, abuse of network 
infrastructure is much harder to track and discover with both 
host-level security software (virus scanners, job monitors, and 
so on) and Layer 7 network security devices such as intrusion 
detection systems (IDS). 
Although transit data intercept can be used for mass scale 
attacks on consumers (for example, identity theft), its main 
threat may be in the area of industrial and financial espionage. 
For example, in a recent string of attacks known as “Operation 
Aurora,” several companies (including Google and Adobe) 
reported loss of confidential information and intellectual 
property. Assuming the structure of this security incident is 
now properly understood, the corporate computers were 
infected through a zero-day vulnerability in a Web browser and 
downloaded malware specifically targeting source code 
repositories [9]. Such an attack could have been faster to stage 
and proliferate if intruders had the ability to inject content (for 
example, poisoned HTML frames) into user traffic regardless 
                                                            
1 We have selected Cisco IOS merely based on length of the database record; 
other network vendors might have similar trends. 
of computer location or connection endpoints, which would 
give attackers a bigger window of opportunity. 
At the same time, while the topic of traffic eavesdropping 
and intercept has been well studied for wireless networks 
[10][11][12], authors are not aware of recent studies that would 
demonstrate the feasibility of man-in-the-middle attacks against 
wide area network infrastructure. This gives an impression that 
manipulation of transit data in generic IP networks is too hard 
or even impossible without physical penetration. 
II. ROUTER AND SWITCH ARCHITECTURE 
To understand why the remote manipulation of transit data 
is not a trivial task, it helps to look at the architecture of a 
modern router or switch with separation of control and 
forwarding planes (Figure 1). Such designs first became 
available in the late 1990s and quickly became the driving 
factor behind the unconstrained growth of the Internet. Instead 
of processing packets in the software forwarding path of earlier 
network devices, modern routers and switches employ network 
processors and ASICs to packet lookup and transfer functions, 
while reserving general purpose processors strictly for path 
computation, configuration, and management purposes. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Control and forwarding plane separation in modern routers 
In a modern router or switch as seen in Figure 1, transit 
traffic does not leave the hardware forwarding plane, where 
network processing units (NPUs) parse packet headers while 
leaving the rest of the payload intact (Figure 2). While it is 
possible to program NPUs to punt certain packets to a control 
plane (Routing Engine), most network devices are designed 
with security considerations in mind that allow only a fixed 
number of header bytes to reach the control plane. This limit 
allows for flow analysis and billing, but it excludes any 
possibility for payload eavesdropping, even after gaining full 
access to a router or switch.     
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Packet structure and the lookup boundaries 
Therefore, analysis and modification of transit traffic on a 
router or switch in principle requires processing outside of the 
forwarding plane. In the remainder of this paper, we will 
discuss methods and ways of achieving this task. 
III. AIDED PAYLOAD ATTACKS  
Throughout this paper, we will assume that the first stage 
attack (node infiltration) is already complete and the attacker is 
able to execute arbitrary code on a target. In this section, we 
will detail an architecture that can be used to execute a second 
stage attack aiming to analyze and/or modify traffic flowing 
through the network device. Such actions can be variably used 
to gain access to data served by this node—hijacking active e-
mail, social network, and remote access sessions; gathering 
personal and corporate Web access profiles and stats; injecting 
malicious code into running HTTP and database connections; 
and so on.  
The most straightforward way to do this would be to utilize 
“service plane” hardware on the router or switch itself (Figure 
3). Such hardware is used by OEM vendors to provide Layer 4 
to Layer 7 packet services like deep packet inspection, stateful 
firewalls, and virus filtering, and in principle consists of high-
performance CPU clusters capable of processing traffic at 
gigabit speeds [13]. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Payload traffic processing in the services plane 
However, such hardware is relatively rare (found on less 
than one percent of network nodes2) and mostly proprietary, 
which makes onboard programming difficult for the attacker.  
For this reason, we will exclude the services plane from 
further consideration in this paper and will concentrate on 
techniques that allow for traffic capture and processing aided 
by external computers. Such computers should be trivially 
available for attackers in the form of their own resources or 
(more likely) previously compromised hosts. However, as 
external traffic processors likely belong to the networks remote 
to the compromised network node, the main challenge is to 
deliver the “interesting” traffic to them in a manner that does 
not disrupt data flow and allows the eavesdropped connection 
to continue. 
For such purpose, we principally distinguish two different 
techniques—traffic redirection and traffic replication. 
                                                            
2 Based on shipping quantities estimated by Juniper Networks  
A. Traffic redirection 
Traffic redirection exploits the fact that Internet 
connections are oblivious to the network path and can use 
asymmetric routing. This allows for a distributed man-in-the-
middle attack using redirection. To create a redirected stream, 
the attacker must first identify the “interesting” traffic and 
funnel it into a captive filter applied to the ingress interface. 
Such a filter is normally designed to single out packets destined 
for a specific server (for instance, a popular resource vulnerable 
to HTTP session hijacking attack), specific protocol with little 
encryption (telnet or FTP), or specific source/destination 
addresses for scans (for example, potential victim’s IP range). 
Next, a feature called filter-based forwarding (FBF) or 
policy-based routing (PBR) is chained to the hardware filter 
entry to send the “interesting” traffic away from its normal 
destination based on the forwarding table and into a specially 
crafted IP-in-IP tunnel terminating at the aid host. 
The aid (traffic processing computer) removes the outer IP 
header wrapper, scans (or stores) the payload, and sends 
packets back into the network with original source and 
destination IP addresses unmodified. Therefore, the intercepted 
traffic reaches its intended destination after a layover stop 
orchestrated by the attacker (Figure 4). This technique can be 
used on widely available routers and L3 switches from major 
vendors and only requires support for filter-based routing and 
IP tunneling such as generic routing encapsulation (GRE), both 
being the mainstay features.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Traffic redirection using IP tunnel 
Moreover, as the captive filter can be changed at any 
moment, an attacker can quickly detail it based on initial 
analysis and thus avoid moving and scanning the large amounts 
of data. For example, if it is determined that the targeted user 
frequently accesses certain social and news sites, filter 
modifiers may be added to focus on Web traffic for specific 
addresses. Likewise, a rolling filter can be used to scan for 
traffic based on the source IP block assigned by a cable or DSL 
access provider. In that case, connections from access network 
tenants (families or individuals) can be singled out for 
examination and subsequent offline analysis, decryption, or 
further development of the ongoing APT attack. 
The same redirection technique can be used in the return 
direction (server to user), where the entire protocol sessions 
(such as HTTP 1.0) can be hijacked and impregnated with viral 
code. Most obviously, this allows for large-scale zero-day 
attacks on the users previously identified as operators of 
vulnerable clients. This capability makes aided payload attacks 
through network infrastructure very efficient and very 
dangerous—instead of relying on drive-by techniques, an 
attacker can push viral content onto Internet users regardless of 
where they go as long as their traffic crosses the infected 
network node. 
The relative ease of traffic redirection practically 
guarantees that this attack can be planned using any transit 
network device, and makes attack recognition challenging even 
when source and destination reside in trusted networks and 
behind strong firewalls.  
However, traffic redirection also has some practical difficulties.  
For one thing, if the remote aid host resides in (or behind) a 
network that supports source checking via filter or a reverse 
path forwarding (RPF) feature, this renders direct flow from 
IP2 to IP1 using IP0 as source impossible. If this happens, an 
attacker will have to establish an aid host in the same network 
where the source or destination of traffic resides. This is 
normally not a challenge when attacking access networks with 
multitudes of weakly protected computers, but it can be a 
challenge when dealing with traffic sourced from (and going 
to) corporate networks. In this latter case, an attacker may have 
to send the processed traffic back to the compromised router in 
the opposite direction of the IP tunnel and route it as usual from 
this point on. Such modification of topology would require a 
slightly more involved router programming. 
For another example, the layover nature of traffic redirect 
attacks may cause bandwidth or delay artifacts. This may 
trigger dissent or complaints from affected users and 
compromise the attacker. Again, such concerns are more likely 
to surface when targeting corporate traffic, where it is common 
to see a significant amount of data within high-speed encrypted 
tunnels. To record such data for analysis without impacting 
timing of the flow, an attacker may have to resort to another 
technique called traffic replication. 
B. Traffic replication 
When using replication, an attacker forks traffic instead of 
redirecting and only sends a copy to processing aids (Figure 5). 
This means delay but neither bandwidth nor network path 
attributes of the original flow change, making this method of 
attack completely invisible to affected connections. Since 
original packets are allowed to proceed to their destination, 
traffic forking is not capable of payload injection and remains 
strictly a method for eavesdropping. 
It is relatively common for routers or switches to support 
native tunneling of replicated packets as a mechanism for 
lawful packet intercept [14]. In principle such capability can be 
reused for unauthorized packet forking, with a remote 
computer simulating a legitimate mediation host and traffic 
analyzer. However, practically speaking, lawful intercept is not 
very useful for attackers in its native form as it involves 
significant modification of a router configuration and use of 
IPsec for delivery of replicated traffic. Therefore, attackers will 
likely resort to less complex mechanisms, such as using packet 
replication and GRE tunnels. 
 
 
Figure 5.  Traffic replication (principle scheme) 
Most of today’s routers and switches are capable of making 
packet copies, which under normal circumstances belong to 
either L3 multicast trees such as IP and MPLS distribution 
paths, or L2 broadcast flooding domains such as bridged 
Ethernet network or virtual private LAN service (VPLS) 
mesh. To make packet forking work, an attacker may employ 
either mechanism, masquerading it as legitimate forwarding 
entries. However, L3 replication normally involves creation of 
forwarding states network-wide, such as point-to-multipoint 
label–switched paths (P2MP LSPs), which may be impractical 
or too risky for an attacker. A much simpler L2 replication 
scheme can be employed at the peering points, where multiple 
routers are interconnected with Ethernet switches. If an 
attacker controls routers R1, R2, and R3, an FBF entry for 
incoming packets from IP0 to IP1 can be matched to a next 
hop toward S1 with hardcoded multicast media access control 
(MAC) as a destination address. This will force S1 to replicate 
the packet on all ports (a normal behavior for unknown 
multicast groups). Routers R2 and R3 will both receive the 
packet; R2 will forward it as usual; and R3 will send it into a 
tunnel towards IP2 via FBF entry. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  L2-based replication using two routers and a switch 
To achieve this, it is sufficient to program R2 and R3 
Ethernet interfaces towards S1 for multicast receiver MAC 
address matching of the L2 next-hop entry on R1. This should 
be enough for packets on R2 and R3 to clear MAC ternary 
content addressable memory (TCAM) and be sent to the L3 
lookup engine. If there are other routers connected to the same 
S1 switch, they will ignore their packet replicas due to 
unknown multicast destination. 
Note that switch S1 does not necessarily have to be in the 
upstream direction towards IP1. If R2 receives the packet and 
determines it must go via another router (for example, R1), it 
will simply send it back. Therefore, destination IP1 is 
guaranteed to receive only one copy of the flow.  
Although this scheme involves significantly more 
equipment and requires access to an L2 broadcast domain, it 
also avoids tampering with the control plane of the entire 
network, as all necessary changes can be programmed locally 
on routers R1, R2, and R3. Switch S1 needs no special 
configuration and does not have to be compromised to achieve 
the result. 
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS 
So far we have discussed the principles and architecture of 
attacks on traffic payloads from compromised network nodes. 
One practical consideration when designing such an attack 
would be the ability to conceal the ongoing activity and allow 
the network node to function as usual. This means that the most 
straightforward method of exploitation—direct reconfiguration 
of a router or switch—is also the less preferred as configuration 
management is normally a closely monitored area of operation. 
Therefore, an attacker will likely aim to leave no trace in 
configuration files and inject the forwarding state changes as 
runtime (ephemeral) entries with no human readable form. This 
method is quite robust with respect to persistency because 
modern network nodes are not rebooted or reconfigured 
frequently and can accumulate uptime measured in months or 
years of continuous operation. With unified in-service software 
upgrade (unified ISSU) in place, routers and switches can even 
pick software fixes without resetting the running forwarding 
table databases. 
To program ephemeral forwarding entries for packet 
redirection or packet replication, one needs to be able to install 
filters and next hops to the forwarding tables of a running 
system. In principle, this involves sending a crafted command 
or communication signal to a process that handles the required 
function. Since the internal details and APIs of such 
communications are not public, the attacker will have to gain 
access to vendors’ software development kit (SDK) and third-
party development toolkits (if available) or intercept and 
reverse engineer communication pipes to figure out the 
commands and arguments needed for ephemeral state changes. 
This task is much less complex than it sounds, because the 
initial analysis is easy to do on a test system by simply tracking 
the logs and messages of processes handling a routine PBR or 
FBF configuration change. In addition, on many routers and 
switches, the forwarding plane itself runs a low-level operating 
system (line-card kernel) where a rich set of command-line 
interface (CLI) commands is available to verify and manipulate 
entries in the forwarding table directly (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 7.  Injecting ephemeral states into control and forwarding planes 
 
In fact, in a typical network operating system, an attacker has 
the choice between locating and modifying local management 
configuration databases for system processes, direct 
modification of main forwarding table entries from a 
management shell, and direct modification of local forwarding 
table entries from the management shell of a line card. This 
diversity of points for tampering gives an attacker a high 
chance of success. 
Once a working combination of instructions is found in the 
physical lab or using a vendor SDK in a virtual/simulation   
environment, it can be easily transferred to the running systems 
by the same vendor. 
V. AIDED PAYLOAD ATTACKS AND SDN 
The software defined network (SDN) is an emerging 
approach to control plane programming that allows for 
centralization of (previously distributed) control plane path 
computation. While there is no single definition of SDN 
architecture, it is most often described as the ability to program 
forwarding planes of the network nodes directly from external 
control servers and appliances, for an increased degree of 
control and flexibility. 
While the control channel of the SDN connection to the 
device may (or may not) be an attractive target for a first stage 
attack on a network node, in this paper we are primarily 
interested in the fact that underlying SDN protocols such as 
Path Computation Element (PCE) [16] and OpenFlow use APIs 
for creating ephemeral forwarding states. In particular, 
Openflow version 1.3 defines functionality of policy routing 
and tunnel (IP-in-IP) connections [15]. Although SDN 
capabilities are not widely supported today, in the future we 
can reasonably expect this feature set to grow larger and cover 
the full range of functions needed for programming of payload 
attacks. 
Existence of SDN connectors capable of forming 
ephemeral states on a router or switch makes the attacker’s life 
easier when creating traffic forks and redirects, because it 
allows exploit toolkits to be less specific to the software 
architecture of the target. For example, instead of decrypting 
proprietary instructions to establish a captive filter for 
interesting traffic, an attacker can send a standardized 
command into an OpenFlow connector to achieve the same 
result. 
Moreover, if the control server is compromised, it makes it 
possible to attack payloads handled by multitudes of controlled 
devices, effectively monitoring or modifying traffic within the 
entire network span. Therefore, proliferation of software-
defined networks may add additional factors to the risks we 
have already described. 
CONCLUSION AND  RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this article, we detail the description of a specific cyberattack 
type that was not previously observed on a large scale. We 
demonstrate that such an attack can be mounted against 
conventional routers and switches and does not require 
extraordinary knowledge of networks or specialized 
programming skills. 
Therefore, in addition to standard security measures 
recommended for all network nodes (such as limiting 
administrative access by hardware-based filters applied to 
loopback interfaces, removal of unsafe and default access 
means and accounts, etc.), we can identify the security 
measures that can be employed to make redirection and 
replication more difficult 
Use of open-source software (OSS) components in network 
equipment operating systems traditionally presents a potential 
vector for the first stage attack. While timely patching remains 
a very effective protection from this threat, it’s often 
overlooked that the networking industry’s release cycle 
cadence is relatively slow. Therefore, specialized network 
devices such as intrusion prevention systems (IPS) are 
recommended to protect against first stage attacks, especially 
where the value of transit data is high. To mitigate the cases 
where an attacker has succeeded in the first stage and has full 
access to the compromised network node, it is important to 
keep the node isolated so that the second stage has little effect 
on the rest of the infrastructure and data flow. As global 
Internet policy, we strongly recommend dropping traffic with 
wrong source addresses originating from leaf networks. For 
transit networks, loose RPF policies are always recommended 
on peering routers. This will force attackers to return traffic to 
the compromised node for re-injection into the network and 
will give security specialists more indicators of the ongoing 
activity. 
For node-specific security enhancement, we would like to raise 
the importance of monitoring the ephemeral forwarding states, 
especially if they are unusual or unexpected for a node type 
such as FBF entries or IP-in-IP tunnels. Vendors should 
provide suitable commands and mechanisms for listing 
forwarding states by policy or next-hop class. 
Finally, we would suggest that security officers and specialists 
pay special attention to network paths taken by critical 
connections such as branch VPN and data center traffic 
crossing public networks. Although the complete view of the 
path in the tunnels is partially hidden from end users, it is quite 
possible to discover unexpected intermediate nodes in the 
return leg of a redirected connection by using regular probing 
tools such as traceroute over TCP. If traceroute shows different 
results when working over TCP and Internet Control Message 
Protocol (ICMP), this might be a sign of divergent routing and 
a good reason for investigation. 
Finally, we recommend elevated security measures when 
deploying SDN controllers. While most of controller 
implementations are based on PC hardware, they are frequently 
deployed alongside other servers or even end-user computers 
and thus become easy victims for virus and botnet outbreaks. 
Considering the potential damage arising from compromising 
SDN controllers, they need to reside on dedicated network 
segments denied of both Internet and Intranet access. 
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